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Mummery 2 
Around 137 million Americans voted in the 2016 presidential election; however, these 
voters only comprise 55.7% of the total eligible voting population, placing the U.S. 28th out of 
35 countries that are a part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation (OECD).1 For years, 
researchers have been searching for ways to increase low voter turnout. As daily and civic life 
continues to move online, some countries and localities have experimented with online voting 
platforms that would align with 21st century technology and capabilities.  
The United States has never implemented an internet voting mechanism in a national 
election and many people argue that such a system will never be feasible because of 
vulnerabilities for election meddling. Given evidence found by special counsel Robert Mueller 
that Russia used cyberattacks to meddle in the 2016 election, the security threat of a remote 
internet voting mechanism seems higher than ever.2 Pursuits to hack U.S. elections still remain a 
high threat as a Russian-owned firm attempted a cyberattack into the Ohio 2019 election.3 
Although this cyberattack was unsuccessful, there is a possibility that votes would not have been 
safe if the election machines were connected to the internet. Despite concern about an increased 
security threat with the implementation of an internet voting system, several U.S. jurisdictions 
such as West Virginia and a county in Utah have recently enacted laws allowing internet voting 
in the future for disabled citizens and military or overseas voters.4 Most monumental in this 
regard is a plan for Seattle and neighboring cities to enable all registered voters to cast their 
 
1 Drew Desilver, “U.S Trails Most Developed Countries in Voter Turnout,” Pew Research Center (2017). 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58706fbb29687f06dd219990/t/5b108a8d70a6ad1221aa63c1/1527810701921/
U.S+voter+turnout+lower+than+most+countries+-+Pew+May+2017.pdf. 
2 Robert Mueller, The Mueller Report, 1st ed. (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House Publishing, 2019).  
3 Marty Johnson, “Russian Firm’s Attempt to Hack Ohio Voting Systems Thwarted,” The Hill (2019). 
https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/472496-russian-firms-attempt-to-hack-ohio-voting-systems-thwarted 
4 Jay Greene, “Voting by Smartphone in Seattle Area Pushes the Limits of Electronic Balloting,” The Washington 
Post (2020). https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/02/11/seattle-smartphone-voting/ 
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ballot from a mobile device or computer in the King County Conservation District election this 
year, the first ever online voting election for all eligible voters in a given district in the U.S.5  
Aside from internet voting potentially increasing voter turnout, states are faced with the 
reality of how a worldwide pandemic will alter precinct ballot methods.6 As fifteen states have 
postponed their primary elections due to Coronavirus (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
Coronavirus 2), the question of an internet voting mechanism as a voting alternative to in person 
precinct voting may be more relevant than ever. As the world continues to digitize, countries 
may be forced to develop a secure internet voting mechanism. The current debate about whether 
to adopt alternative voting methods in the 2020 general election raises the question of how such 
methods affect turnout. This paper contributes to that discussion and the larger political science 
literature by asking to what extent would a remote electronic voting mechanism affect voter 
turnout? Analysis of electronic voting in three different countries (Estonia, Australia, and 
Canada) and various election types finds that voter turnout on average does increase when 
electronic voting is available.  
Literature Review 
 As the United States lags behind most developed democracies in voter turnout rates, 
researchers and activists of various stripes are eager to find a solution to boost voter turnout. The 
literature on, and potential answers to why voter turnout is low, and how to increase it, are 
virtually endless. Countries have implemented various convenience voting measures in hopes of 
 
5 Ibid.  
6 Nick Corasaniti and Stephanie Saul, “15 States Have Postponed Their Primaries Because of Coronavirus. Here’s a 
List,” The New York Times (2020). https://www.nytimes.com/article/2020-campaign-primary-calendar-
coronavirus.html 
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increasing voter turnout, including internet voting. Remote internet voting is the practice of 
voting via an internet enabled device like a computer or smartphone that is not under physical 
control of election officials.7  A rising number of adults who own an internet enabled device and 
a societal advance in technology has left many curious about the possibility of an internet voting 
mechanism for local and national elections. While over twenty countries have piloted or 
implemented some form of internet voting in an election, Estonia is the only country to currently 
offer the option to its entire eligible voting population in its national election.8 While it 
theoretically makes sense that an internet voting mechanism would increase voter turnout, the 
literature on whether internet voting increases turnout presents mixed results. 
Convenience voting is any measure that allows citizens to cast their ballot other than by 
arriving in person at precinct-polling places on election day.9 For example, some convenience 
voting measures include mail-in-ballots, early voting, call-in ballots, and remote internet voting. 
Studies have shown a positive increase in turnout when using convenience methods, ranging 
from a 5% to 10% increase when vote by mail was an option and approximately a 5% increase 
with early voting.10  The main idea behind convenience voting is to increase political 
participation by making voting more convenient. To understand why convenience voting would 
theoretically increase voter turnout, it is imperative to understand the rational choice model of 
voting proposed by economist Anthony Downs. This model consists of a cost-benefit analysis on 
 
7 Michael R. Alvarez and Thad E. Hall, Point, Click, and Vote: The Future of Internet Voting,1st ed. (Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004) 4.  
8 Nicole Goodman and Rodney Smith, “Internet Voting in Sub-national Elections: Policy Learning in Canada and 
Australia,” The International Conference on Electronic Voting (2016). 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Krimmer/publication/311101401_Proceedings_of_the_International_C
onference_for_Electronic_Voting_E-Vote-ID_2016/links/583d933108ae61f75dc461de/Proceedings-of-the-
International-Conference-for-Electronic-Voting-E-Vote-ID-2016.pdf#page=299 
9 Paul Gronke, Eva Galanes-Rosenbaum, Peter Miller, and Daniel Toffey, “Convenience Voting,” Annual Review of 
Political Science (2008): 438. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053006.190912 
10 Ibid.  
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behalf of the voter, in which an individual votes if the benefits outweigh the costs.11 Here, the 
marginal return is the benefit a voter receives from casting a vote and the marginal cost is all the 
costs undergone by the actor in order to cast their vote.12 These costs include factors like the cost 
of collecting information about candidates, processing it in order to decide whom to vote for, 
registering for the election, and physically going to the polls on election day.13 Surely other 
factors play into the calculation of these costs, such as the weather on election day, the cost of 
missing work or school in order to cast a vote, or a person's distance from a polling station.14 
Characteristically, these factors act as opportunity costs, where undertaking them limits time one 
spends on other choice activities.15 Ultimately, “the higher the cost of voting, the lower the 
probability of voting,” so that the “easier it is for a person to cast a ballot, the more likely he is to 
vote.”16 This explanation sheds light on how an internet voting mechanism could make voting 
more convenient, thereby increasing turnout.  
 According to the rational choice model, implementing an internet voting system would 
increase voter turnout by lowering the cost of voting. The cost of physically going to the polling 
booth would be eliminated by the fact that people could vote via any remote device that is 
connected to the internet. Factors that affect the magnitude of costs such as inclement weather, 
distance from a polling station, and missing school or work would not play any role in 
determining whether a person votes or not. According to American Community Survey Reports, 
as of 2017, 86.8% of households in the U.S. own some form of a computer, whether that is a 
 
11 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, 1st ed. (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 1957),146-148.  
12 Ibid.  
13 John H. Aldrich, "Rational Choice and Turnout," American Journal of Political Science 37, no. 1 (1993): 248. 
doi:10.2307/2111531. 
14 Moshe Haspel and Gibbs Knotts, "Location, Location, Location: Precinct Placement and the Costs of Voting," 
Journal of Politics 67, no. 2 (2005): 560-73. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00329.x. 
15Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven Rosenstone, Who Votes?, 1st ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1980) 8.  
16 Wolfinger, 8.  
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laptop, desktop computer, or handheld device, like a smartphone.17 This percentage has been 
rising in recent years and is likely to continue to do so. Therefore, this data suggests that a 
majority of Americans would have immediate access to an internet voting platform if the option 
were available. However, elderly and poorer people account for less of this total.18 If the system 
of voting were set up to allow both an internet voting mechanism and the traditional polling 
booth option, then the elderly and lower socioeconomic individuals who do not own an internet-
enabled device would not be disadvantaged. Consequently, internet voting would decrease the 
costs of voting for some and leave the costs of voting unchanged for everyone else.  
 Internet voting may increase turnout among groups that traditionally turn out at lower 
rates, namely younger voters.19 Voters aged 18-34 have a much lower turnout rate compared to 
older voters. However, they are more likely to prefer an online voting system, whereas older 
people are more likely to prefer voting at the polling booth.20 While 94.3% of people ages 18-34 
own either a computer or handheld smartphone, only 70.9% of people ages 65 and up own 
them.21  
Providing an online voting method would possibly increase voter turnout of young voters 
for a variety of reasons. First, because younger people are more likely to regularly use the 
internet, the cost of casting a vote on election day via an already frequently used device would be 
far less than making the trip to an unfamiliar polling station, especially for those without access 
to a car or other transportation. Second, since younger voters frequently move, providing a 
 
17Camille Ryan and Jamie M. Lewis, “Computer and Internet Use in the United States: 2015,” American 
Community Survey Reports, United States Census Bureau (2015). 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/acs/acs-37.pdf 
18 Ibid.,7.  
19 John M. Strate, Charles J. Parrish, Charles D. Elder, and Coit Ford, “Life Span Civic Development and Voting 
Participation,” American Political Science Review 83, no. 2 (1989): 443–64. doi:10.2307/1962399. 
20 Jennifer Stromer-Galley, “Society Online,” 1st ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004). 97-98. 
21 Ryan and Lewis, 4. 
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remote voting system would reduce the cost associated with figuring out states’ bureaucratic 
voting systems, assuming the system was universal across all states. Third, an internet voting 
system would limit the cost of missing school or other important obligations that make voting 
difficult for younger citizens. Additionally, people who are temporarily traveling out of the state 
or the country would also be able to vote remotely at the time of the election. Furthermore, 
encouraging young people to vote will likely pay dividends in the future since voting tends to be 
habitual; people who have voted a few times when they were young tend to be life-long voters.22 
However, it could be argued that there will be an increase in overall turnout when an internet 
voting option is first made available because of people’s curiosity for new technologies, thereby 
increasing voter turnout in the first election where internet voting is made an option and decrease 
in subsequent elections.23  
 At the same time, internet voting may decrease turnout. Trust in the government is 
correlated with voter turnout, and a decline in trust leads to a decline in voter turnout.24 Many 
people believe that an online voting system presents a high potential for cyber-attack from 
outside actors, or coercion outside the typical private voting booth from others that would force 
them to vote a particular way. As voter turnout decreases from a decline in trust in government, 
an online voting system might intensify people’s distrust in the system, and as a result, voter 
turnout would also decrease. 
 
22 Benny Geys, “‘Rational’ Theories of Voter Turnout: A Review,” Political Studies Review 4, no. 1 (2006) 16-
35.doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-9299.2006.00034.x. 
23 Anne-Marie Oostveen and Peter Van Den Besselaar, “Internet Voting Technologies and Civic Participation: The 
Users’ Perspective,” Journal of the European Institute for Communications and Culture 11, no.1 (2014): 
71.doi.org/10.1080/13183222.2004.11008847 
24 Eric Belanger and Richard Nadeau, “Political Trust and the Vote in Multiparty Elections: The Canadian Case,” 
European Journal of Political Research 44, no. 1 (2005): 136. doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00221.x.  
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Estonia is the first and thus far the only country that allows remote internet voting in 
national and local elections for all citizens. The decision to incorporate internet voting in the 
civic participation process received broad based political support in an attempt to develop the 
information and communications sector of the economy and to include internet in intra-
governmental activities.25 In 2005, Estonia used an internet enabled voting mechanism in all of 
their local elections. In 2007, Estonia held the first ever Parliamentary election with the option 
for all citizens to vote via the internet.26 Since then, twenty other countries have experimented 
with internet voting and fifteen have implemented it in a particular election; however, several 
have discontinued its use.27 These programs were largely canceled because of marginal and 
unclear impacts on voter turnout, security concerns, and lack of budget resources to implement 
the mechanisms.28  
Ten countries still use some form of remote internet voting including Australia, Armenia, 
France, India, Mexico, Panama, United States, Estonia, Switzerland and Canada.29 Of these, 
Armenia, France, Mexico, Panama and the United States have restricted remote internet voting in 
national elections to citizens living abroad or active military personnel living abroad, instead of 
the entire voting population.30  For example, in 2000 and 2008, the United States piloted remote 
internet voting for active military personnel overseas and other citizens living abroad.31  In an 
effort to increase the participation of military and overseas voters, the MOVE (Military and 
 
25 Michael Alvarez, Thad Hall, and Alexander Trechsel, “Internet Voting in Comparative Perspectives: The Case of 
Estonia,” Political Science and Politics 42, no.3 (2009): 500. doi:10.1017/S1049096509090787 
26 Ibid.,498.  
27 Nicole Goodman and Leah C. Stokes, “Reducing the Costs of Voting: An Evaluation of Internet Voting’s Effect 
on Turnout,” Cambridge University Press (2018): 2. doi:10.1017/S0007123417000849. 
28 Goodman and Stokes, 2.  
29 Goodman and  Smith. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Jordi Barrat Esteve, Ben Goldsmith, and John Turner, “International Experience with E-Voting,” International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems (2012): 13. 
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Overseas Voter Empowerment) Act was passed in 2009, mandating that all states provide 
military and overseas voters the opportunity to request and receive ballots online.32 This act 
provided a gateway for certain states to pilot and adopt mechanisms for these voters to return 
their ballots electronically as well, serving as the only form of remote online voting in the United 
States. It is possible that states can use these pilot programs for future local or national elections.  
In 2008, Okaloosa County in Florida piloted a distance balloting voting mechanism via internet 
enabled kiosks in several locations such as Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom.33 Votes 
were marked at the kiosk locations and sent via the internet back to Okaloosa County. In France, 
electronic voting was available for electing representatives for the elections to the Assembly of 
French Citizens Living Abroad.34  
Australia, India, Switzerland, and Canada have implemented internet voting in 
subnational, local, or national referenda elections, excluding national parliamentary elections. In 
India, the state of Gujarat piloted and started offering the option of online voting in the 2015 
municipal election; however data on voter turnout for these municipal elections and prior 
elections without internet voting is unavailable.35 Switzerland offers an advanced internet voting 
system for municipal, cantonal, and federal referenda elections.36 Because Swiss elections 
include referenda, some elections may have greater turnout because salient policy proposals are 
on the ballot, while other elections may not have salient proposals. Without knowing which 
elections included referenda that would likely generate a boost in turnout, it is difficult to control 
 
32 Charles Stewart III, “Voting Technologies,” Annual Review of Political Science 14, (2011): 360. doi: 
10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.053007.145205 
33 Michael Alvarez, Thad Hall, Kinsey Gimbel, and Brian Griepentrog, “The 2008 Okaloosa Distance Balloting 
Pilot Project,” Fors Marsh Group (2012). https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/OkaloosaPilotProject_20151228.pdf  
34 Esteve, Goldsmith, Turner, 13.  
35 Hiral Devrajbhai, “After Compulsory Voting, Gujarat Now Offers the Online Option,” The Indian Express 
(2015). https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/after-compulsory-voting-gujarat-now-offers-the-online-
option/ and “Online Voting,” Scytl. https://www.scytl.com/en/online-voting/ 
36 Esteve, Goldsmith, Turner, 13. 
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for these effects and generate a valid estimate of the effects of electronic voting on turnout; 
therefore, I did not investigate Switzerland in this study. 
The literature on whether the implementation of internet voting increases voter turnout 
presents an array of possible positive and negative results. It is important to recognize that 
virtually all studies are solely based on a single country; therefore, the mixed results may be due 
to the variation in political factors in each country. My goal is to evaluate voter turnout in a 
variety of countries that have implemented internet voting to better understand its effect on 
turnout. Some studies show that internet voting has a small or null effect on voter turnout. 
Studies have shown that internet voting did not attract voters who would have otherwise not 
voted; instead the method merely acted as a substitute for votes at a traditional polling location.37 
In addition, some studies have found that implementing internet voting does not appeal to social 
groups that normally abstain from voting; rather it attracts the same politically motivated 
groups.38 One study conducted in Switzerland for a referendum election found that where 
traditional precinct voting and mail-in-ballots were an option, internet voting did not increase 
turnout as people relied more heavily on mail-in-ballots and those who voted online would have 
voted anyway if the option was not available.39 Similarly, in another study internet voting 
provided modest gains in turnout for the younger generation; however, a majority of the increase 
in turnout was a result of the mail-in-ballot option as it increased turnout for the elderly 
generation at a higher percentage than the percentage gain from younger generation internet 
voters.40 Thus, numerous studies concluded that internet voting perhaps made voting more 
 
37 Daniel Bochsler, “Can the Internet Increase Political Participation?,” Central European University (2010). And 
Micha Germann and Uwe Serdült, “Internet Voting and Turnout: Evidence from Switzerland,” Electoral Studies 47, 
no.1 (2017): doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2017.03.001. 
38 Bochsler. 
39 Germann and Serdült.  
40 Pippa Norris, “Will New Technology Boost Turnout?,” Electronic Voting and Democracy (2004): 193-194. 
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convenient, but this convenience was overshadowed by mail-in-ballot measures and individuals 
who would have voted regardless of voting mode.  
Other studies, by contrast, have found voter turnout to increase with the implementation 
of internet voting. Studies in Switzerland and Brazil for referenda elections have found an 
increase in voter turnout between 2 percentage points to as high as 9 percentage points in 
Switzerland41 and an 8.2 percentage point increase in Brazil.42 While other studies show a null 
impact of internet voting on voter turnout in Switzerland,43 it is important to recognize that in 
cases like Switzerland and Brazil, any given referenda election can have dramatically higher or 
lower voter participation depending on what issue is on the ballot.  
Other studies find internet voting brings modest increases in turnout in other types of 
elections. Those marginal increases were found in Ontario municipal elections with an increase 
of 3.5 percentage points when internet voting is an option; however, internet voting generates 
larger increases in turnout when mail-in-ballots are not adopted.44 This suggests that convenience 
voting increases voter turnout; however, internet voting competes for turnout with other 
convenience voting methods. Thus, the amount of increase in turnout will presumably depend in 
large part on what voting options a country is currently using. A larger increase in turnout will 
likely be found in elections with little or no convenience voting options and smaller gains in 
elections that are more accommodating. A study in Estonia found that voter turnout increased in 
several elections when internet voting was an option.45 Although many internet voters were 
 
41 Jan Gerlach and Urs Gasser, “Three Case Studies from Switzerland: E-Voting,” Berkman Center Research 
Publication, no. 2009-03.1 (2009).  
42 Paolo Spada, Jonathan Mellon, Tiago Peixoto, and Fredrik Sjoberg, “Effects of the Internet on Participation: 
Study of a Public Policy Referendum in Brazil,” Journal of Information Technology & Politics 13, no.3 (2016): 187-
207.  
43 Germann and Serdült. 
44 Goodman and Stokes, 1.  
45 Kristjan Vassil and Till Weber, “A Bottleneck Model of E-Voting: Why Technology Fails to Boost Turnout,” 
New Media and Society 13, no. 8 (2011): 1336-54. DOI: 10.1177/1461444811405807 
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already politically engaged, a few ‘peripheral citizens’ or those that are not politically engaged, 
choose to vote via internet voting because of fascination with the technology.46 Therefore, while 
few in number, disengaged citizens turnout increased with internet voting, potentially acting as a 
stepping stone for political participation among marginal groups. 
Based on these studies, I hypothesize that implementing an online voting method will 
increase voter turnout by lowering the costs associated with in person voting on election day. 
Lowering the costs of voting will likely boost turnout for those who do not normally vote such as 
the younger generation, those who live far from polling centers, and physically impaired voters. 
My hypothesis assumes that traditional polling booth voting would still be an option for those 
who might be unable to vote on the internet such as lower-income Americans and senior citizens.  
Methods 
I examined turnout in Estonia, Canada, and Australia. I selected these countries because 
they offer multiple types of elections to examine, including national legislative, European Union, 
sub-national, and local elections and because data are available for time periods prior to and after 
the implementation of internet voting.  
Estonia is an ideal case to study internet voting and voter turnout because it has offered 
the option in three different election types and over the course of several elections. Prior to 
internet voting, Estonia relied solely on paper-based precinct voting with early voting as well.47 
In order to vote online, a voter needs to authenticate themselves using an ID card which is a 
 
46 Ibid.  
47 Alvarez, Hall, and Trechsel, 498.  
Mummery 13 
standard identification mechanism in Estonia.48 The voter then selects a candidate and the vote is 
sent to the online server. The electronic ballots are kept in the signed and encrypted version until 
the voting period is over, whereby signatures are dropped and anonymous ballots are tallied in 
order to ensure voter anonymity.49 It is also important to recognize that this system allows re-
voting measures where voters can recast their votes several times so that the last vote is counted 
in order to prevent coercion.50 For the purpose of my study, I collected data on voter turnout in 
all three types of elections prior to and after internet voting was implemented.51 From there, I 
calculated the average turnout in each election prior to internet voting and after its 
implementation in order to compare the effect on voter turnout across each election type 
separately.  
Australia has not implemented an internet voting mechanism for national elections; 
however, New South Wales adopted remote online voting for state elections in 2011. There are 
two interesting factors about New South Wales that make it useful for study. First, voting in New 
South Wales is mandatory. Second, the online voting mechanism can only be used by disabled 
citizens, those who live in remote rural areas away from a polling location, and citizens residing 
out of state. These factors severely limit the capacity of internet voting to boost turnout. Prior to 
internet voting in 2011, New South Wales offered traditional precinct-voting, early voting, and 
vote-by-mail methods as options to vote.52 As with the Estonia case, I conducted my analysis of 
 
48 Sven Heiberg and Jan Willemson, “Verifiable Internet Voting in Estonia,” Estonian Research Council. 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.691.7457&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid.  
51 “Voter Turnout Database,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. 
https://www.idea.int/data-tools/country-view/99/40 
52 “Report on the 2007 State Election,” New South Wales Electoral Commission. 
https://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/NSWEC/media/NSWEC/Reports/Election%20reports/2007-State-election-report-
(PDF-3.6MB).pdf 
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New South Wales by comparing average voter turnout in all of the elections prior to the 
implementation of an internet voting system with turnout averages after.53  
Canada is similar to Australia in that remote internet voting has not been used in a 
national election; however, starting in 2003, some municipalities allowed internet voting and 
others did not. Over the subsequent elections, some municipalities adopted internet voting while 
some that had instituted internet voting later decided to discontinue its use.  However, unlike 
New South Wales, remote internet voting is not limited to certain demographic groups, rather the 
entire eligible voting population can vote online in certain Ontario municipalities that have 
chosen to adopt the method. Data collection and analysis for Ontario municipal elections will 
take a slightly different approach. 
 First, using Stokes and Goodman’s dataset of Ontario municipalities that have adopted 
internet voting on or before 2014, I calculated the average voter turnout of each municipality 
before it implemented internet voting compared to the years after internet voting was 
implemented.54 Each municipality has voter turnout data starting in 2000, when no municipality 
had internet voting, and spans six elections to 2014, when all 98 municipalities in this dataset had 
internet voting. From there, I calculated the total number of municipalities where voter turnout 
increased with the implementation of internet voting compared to the number of municipalities 
where voter turnout decreased. In addition, I calculated the average voter turnout for all elections 
with internet voting compared to the average turnout in all elections without internet voting. 
Lastly, I evaluated voter turnout each year by comparing the average turnout for municipalities 
 
53  “Electoral Statistics,” New South Wales Electoral Commission. https://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/About-
us/Reports/Electoral-Statistics 
54 Stokes, Leah; Goodman, Nicole, 2018, "Replication Data for: Reducing the Cost of Voting: An Evaluation of 
Internet Voting's Effect on Turnout", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KMMN1B, Harvard Dataverse, V1, 
UNF:6:T67aDIi2kGXbs0OuUOYW6Q== [fileUNF]  
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that had internet voting and those that did not for each year starting in 2000 and ending in 2014. 
However, it is important to note that for 2000 there are no data on voter turnout with internet 
voting as no municipalities had it in that year and similarly in 2014 there are no data on average 
voter turnout without internet voting as the dataset only has values for municipalities that have 
implemented online voting on or before 2014.  
Second, I gathered turnout data on all 444 Ontario municipalities for the 2018 municipal 
elections.55 Of the 444 municipalities, 175 of them allowed internet voting and 214 of them did 
not. It is important to note that 55 municipalities either did not report information on the types of 
voting mechanisms used or data on turnout for that given year.56 I calculated the average voter 
turnout in all the municipalities that had internet voting in the 2018 municipal elections 
compared to the average of those that did not. This two-part study of Ontario municipal elections 
is informative as it paints a picture of voter turnout from multiple angles within a given 
providence.  
I relied on the data from the Goodman and Stokes study of internet voting for my own 
study.57 Goodman and Stokes found a 3.5 percentage point increase with internet voting. 
However, their data only included municipalities that had adopted internet voting on or sometime 
before 2014 and excluded the hundreds of municipalities that did not have internet voting in 
2014.  I added to their study by calculating the total number of municipalities where voter 
turnout increased or decreased with the implementation of internet voting. Additionally, I 
calculated the effects of internet voting over time by calculating turnout with and without 
internet voting for each year with an election up to 2014. My biggest addition to their study was 
 
55 “List of Ontario Municipalities,” Government of Ontario. https://www.ontario.ca/page/government-ontario 
56 “2018 Ontario Municipal Elections: Ontario Votes,” Association of Municipalities Ontario. 
https://elections.amo.on.ca/web/en/municipal/19411 
57 Goodman and Stokes.  
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that I found turnout data for almost all of Ontario’s municipalities in 2018, not just the 
municipalities that adopted internet voting, which allowed me to see the effect of internet voting 
on turnout for an entire state. Ontario municipal elections are rather progressive in the types of 
convenience voting methods offered ranging from early voting, vote-by-mail, braille ballots, vote 
by phone call, and even rides to and from precinct polling locations. However, each of the 444 
municipalities is different in terms of what voting options they offer and when they started 
offering them.  
Results 
In this section I describe the results from Estonia’s three election types first, followed by 
results from New South Wales, Australia and Ontario, Canada.  
Estonia:    
 Estonia adopted internet voting in three types of elections: Parliamentary elections, 
European Union (EU) Parliamentary elections, and local elections. The percentage of voters who 
used internet voting in the Parliamentary election when it was first instituted in 2007 was 3.4%, 
and has gradually increased to 27.9% by 2019.58 For EU Parliamentary elections the percentage 
of voters using internet voting grew from 6.5% in 2009 to 17.6% in 2019.59 Finally, in local 
Estonian elections the percentage of internet voting increased from .9% in 2009 to 16.9% in 
 
58 “Statistics about Internet Voting in Estonia,” Valimized (2019). https://www.valimised.ee/en/archive/statistics-
about-internet-voting-estonia 
59 Ibid. 
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2017.60 Thus, the percentage of voters utilizing internet voting is reasonably high and growing 
rapidly, suggesting that an increasing amount of people are becoming familiar with online 
technology. 
An increasing percentage of voters opted to cast their ballot via the internet, but did more 
citizens vote overall or did citizens who were already voting merely switch their voting method?  
Overall, voter turnout increased on average after the introduction of internet voting for the EU 
Parliamentary elections and the local elections but decreased slightly for the Parliamentary 
elections in Estonia (see Figure 1).  
 
 
 
Parliamentary Elections: 
 The average voter turnout in the five parliamentary elections before Estonia implemented 
internet voting was 65.7% (see Figure 2). When internet voting was introduced in 2007, the 
average voter turnout for the subsequent years was 64.3% (see Figure 2). Voter turnout was 
 
60 Ibid.  
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lower on average when internet voting was implemented by 1.4 percentage points. However, 
these averages may mask an increase in turnout after the introduction of internet voting. The 
highest turnout was 78.2% in 1990, which is roughly 10 percentage points higher than the next 
highest year (see Figure 2). Estonia gained its independence in 1990. The high turnout in 1990 
was presumably due to the excitement of being able to participate in a democratic election for the 
first time. After the first election, turnout declined in the subsequent two elections to about 70% 
(see Figure 2). The following two elections, the two elections before internet voting was adopted, 
turnout fell to 57.8% (see Figure 2). If the two elections just prior to the adoption of internet 
voting are taken as the baseline, turnout increased with the availability of internet voting. Thus, 
viewed in the most positive light, voter turnout increased from about 58% to about 64% when 
internet voting was made an option. 
 
 
=  = voter turnout without internet voting 
      
      = voter turnout with internet voting  
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European Union Parliamentary Elections:  
 
 Voter turnout prior to the implementation of an internet voting system for the EU 
parliamentary election was 26.8% in 2004 (see Figure 3). This was the first and only year 
Estonia had an EU election without an internet voting mechanism. In the subsequent years when 
internet voting was made an option, average voter turnout was 39.3%, 12.5 percentage points 
higher than before internet voting was allowed (see Figure 3). However, this jump in turnout may 
not be exclusively due to the implementation of internet voting. It is possible that turnout in this 
type of election would increase over time as people learn more about the EU and consequently 
think it is important to vote in this election.  
 
=  = voter turnout without internet voting 
      
      = voter turnout with internet voting  
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Local Elections:  
 The first four free and fair elections in Estonia (1993-2004) did not have internet voting. 
In the elections without internet voting, the average turnout was 51.9% (see Figure 4). In 2005, 
internet voting was used with an average voter turnout of 54.8% over the next subsequent 
elections, a 2.98 percentage point increase in average turnout in the year’s internet voting was an 
option. The highest turnout was 60.6% in 2009 with internet voting and the lowest was 47.4% in 
2005, the first-year internet voting was made an option. However, after the first election with 
internet voting, voter turnout sharply increased. 
 
 
=  = voter turnout without internet voting 
      
      = voter turnout with internet voting  
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New South Wales State Elections: 
 New South Wales did not have internet voting from 1995 to 2007, and in those years the 
average voter turnout was 91.5%. Figure 5 presents turnout in New South Wales elections over 
time (see Figure 5 —note that the scale in the graph below starts at 80% voter turnout in order to 
see the difference between turnout in subsequent years easier).61 Since voting is mandatory in 
New South Wales, the turnout rate was already high. Beginning in 2011, New South Wales 
implemented remote internet voting for citizens who are blind or visually impaired, have a 
disability, live in remote rural areas, or for residents currently outside of the state.62  In 2011, 
51,103 eligible citizens registered to vote using this method, and of this group 46,864 (92%) 
eligible citizens voted via internet voting on election day.63 In the years that internet voting was 
made an option for this group, overall voter turnout on average was 92.9%. Therefore, voter 
turnout increased on average by 1.5 percentage points. This is a notable increase due to the fact 
that New South Wales elections are mandatory, meaning that there is little room to grow an 
already high voter turnout rate. In addition, only specific groups could vote by internet, not the 
entire eligible voting population. New South Wales is unique in its attempt to increase voter 
turnout from marginalized groups that are at a disadvantage from in person voting on election 
day, while not offering this method to the entire population. While this reduces their costs of 
implementing a new system for their entire eligible voting population, it is possible that voter 
turnout would further increase if they made the option available for their entire electorate. In 
 
61 “Electoral Statistics,” New South Wales Electoral Commission. https://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/About-
us/Reports/Electoral-Statistics 
62 “Evaluation of Technology Assisted Voting Provided at the New South Wales State General Election March 
2011,” The Allen Consulting Group (2011). 
https://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/NSWEC/media/NSWEC/Reports/iVote%20reports/Evaluation-of-technology-
assisted-voting-provided-at-the-New-South-Wales-State-general-election-March-2011-(PDF-1005kB).pdf  
63 Ibid.  
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New South Wales, turnout increased among populations that traditionally had lower turnout. 
Perhaps internet voting would do the same for other relatively low turnout groups like young 
voters.   
 
 
Ontario Municipal Elections:  
Certain municipalities in Ontario offered internet voting starting as early as 2003. In 
2003, 12 municipalities enabled internet voting, increasing every year until 2018 when 178 
municipalities had internet voting. For each municipality that adopted internet voting sometime 
between 2003 and 2014, I compared average turnout in elections prior to the implementation of 
internet voting and after the implementation.  In certain cases, a municipality had implemented 
internet voting and then went back to other voting methods in subsequent years. In these cases, I 
=  = voter turnout without internet voting 
      
      = voter turnout with internet voting  
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took the average voter turnout in the years that internet voting was made an option in a specific 
municipality and compared that to the average turnout in the same municipality in years without 
internet voting. Turnout was higher on average after internet voting was adopted in 53 of the 98 
(54%) municipalities that adopted it.  However, turnout was lower on average in 45 of the 98 
municipalities when internet voting was an option. Across all 98 municipalities, average turnout 
when internet voting was an option was 44.2% compared to 42.6% when internet voting was not 
an option, a difference of 1.57 percentage points.  Figure 6 portrays the vast variation in voter 
turnout rates across all municipalities with a high of 34.4 percentage point increase and low of 
23.4 percentage point decrease in turnout when an internet voting mechanism was used (see 
Figure 6).  
 
The line graph below represents the average voter turnout per year in all the 
municipalities that had implemented internet voting for that year and all the municipalities that 
did not for that year, among the 98 municipalities that had adopted internet voting by 2014 (see 
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Figure 7). Every year, voter turnout is higher on average in the municipalities that implemented 
voter turnout versus those who did not. However, voter turnout decreased in a linear fashion on 
average for municipalities that implemented internet voting after it was first adopted in 2003. On 
the other hand, voter turnout slightly increased for municipalities that did not implement internet 
voting. Note that in 2000, no municipalities had implemented internet voting yet and all of these 
municipalities had adopted internet voting by 2014.  
The data from Ontario only represents the municipalities that had some form of internet 
voting on or before 2014. The limitation of this set of data is that it only consists of 
municipalities that adopted internet voting at some point on or before 2014. There is a possibility 
that this set of municipalities is systematically different from the remaining municipalities that 
did not implement internet voting some time before 2014. For example, it is possible that 
municipalities that implemented internet voting had a history of low voter turnout; therefore, 
implementing such technology was an attempt to increase voter turnout. On the other hand, it is 
possible that municipalities that did not implement internet voting had other ways to make voting 
easier like mail in or telephone ballots.    
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Although turnout data for the municipalities that had not adopted internet voting through 
2014 were not readily available for earlier elections, I collected turnout data for all 444 of 
Ontario’s municipalities for the 2018 election, some of which allowed internet voting, and some 
did not. The official returns for Ontario did not report turnout for the methods of voting for 55 
municipalities, leaving 389 municipalities for analysis.  Overall, the average voter turnout in 
municipalities without internet voting in 2018 was 40.9%. Where internet voting was made an 
option, voter turnout was 42.2%. Therefore, average turnout was higher by 1.3 percentage points 
where internet voting was made an option in the 2018 municipal elections, a difference 
statistically significant at the .10 level (p=.09).  
 To sum up the Canadian cases, voter turnout was marginally higher when internet voting 
was an option.  
Summary of Results 
 What do these results across three different countries and various types of elections tell 
us? These results can be read in a range of ways. One conclusion is that turnout increased in all 
the countries and all the election types examined except one (Estonia's parliamentary elections—
see table 2) that adopted internet voting. Even in that one instance if we use the two elections 
prior to the adoption of internet voting as the benchmark instead of all pre-internet voting 
elections, turnout increased by about 6 percentage points. Turnout even increased where it was 
least likely to—in Australia, where turnout was already high and only a small group of people 
could take advantage of internet voting.  
However, one might argue that the results show internet voting offers a minimal turnout 
boost of between 1 to 3 points, a boost that varies so much that in many instances, such as almost 
half of Ontario's municipal districts, turnout actually declines. While average voter turnout was 
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1.3 percentage points higher for municipalities that offered internet voting in the 2018 Ontario 
election, each municipality differed in terms of various voting methods offered to make voting 
easier which could have had a bigger effect on turnout rather than just internet voting. The 
highest increase in voter turnout after the implementation of internet voting was in the Estonia 
EU election (12.5 percent). The smallest increase in voter turnout was in the 2018 Ontario 
Municipal election (1.4 percent). This large variance in voter turnout increase can likely be 
attributed to a multitude of factors, such as each country having very different political 
institutions and climates, which can affect voter turnout in any given year with and without 
internet voting as an option. Additionally, larger gains in turnout can be seen in places like 
Estonia where the convenience voting options prior to internet voting were non-existent 
compared to smaller gains in turnout in places like certain Ontario municipalities that offer much 
more progressive voting options.  
Table 2: Voter Turnout with and without Internet Voting in Estonia, New South Wales, and Ontario 
Elections: Average Turnout in 
Elections with 
Internet Voting 
Average Turnout in 
Elections without 
Internet Voting  
Difference 
 (in percentage points)         
Estonia Parliamentary 
Election 
64.3% 65.7% -1.4 
Estonia EU 
Parliamentary 
Election 
39.3% 26.8% +12.5 
Estonia Local 
Election 
54.8% 51.9% +2.9 
New South Wales 
State Election 
92.9% 91.5% +1.4 
Ontario Municipal 
Elections (2018) 
42.2% 40.9% +1.3 
Note: - equates to a lower percentage when internet voting is made an option and + equates to a positive difference when internet 
voting is an option. 
Mummery 27 
Conclusion 
Based on my analysis of voter turnout from three different countries and four different 
election types, I found that voter turnout does generally increase when an internet voting 
mechanism is adopted (the Estonia Parliamentary election is the one exception). Voter turnout 
increased anywhere between 1.3 and 12.5 percentage points; however, in most cases the average 
increase was around 1.5 to 6 percentage points. These estimates are similar to earlier studies of 
internet voting and other methods of making voting more convenient (e.g. mail in ballots, early 
voting). For example, Goodman and Stokes64 found internet voting increased voter turnout by 
about 3.5 percentage points, while other studies of convenience voting typically find a 2-4 
percentage point increase in voter turnout.65 
 Some may see this as an important effect on voter turnout, while others could see these 
gains in turnout rather trivial. I argue that such an increase in voter turnout is worth the cost of 
implementing an internet voting system. In elections where the margin of votes between two 
candidates is between 1.5 and 6 percentage points, a turnout boost of this magnitude that skewed 
towards one party could change the outcome of that election. For example, in the 2016 
presidential election, the national popular vote margin between Clinton and Trump was 2.1 
percentage points. The vote difference in swing states was 1.2 percentage points in Florida, .7 
percentage points in Pennsylvania , .8 percentage points Wisconsin, and .2 percentage points in 
Michigan.66 That said, while it is difficult to know what the partisan implications of a boost in 
turnout would be, a potential boost in turnout from implementing an internet voting system could 
 
64 Goodman and Stokes.  
65 Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, Miller, and Toffey, 437-55.  
66 Rob Griffin, Ruy Teixeira, and John Halpin, “Voter Trends in 2016,” Center for American Progress (2017). 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2017/11/01/441926/voter-trends-in-2016/ 
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nonetheless affect a close election. However, internet voting as a matter of policy does not need 
to be outcome determinative, rather the goal is to increase voter engagement in the political 
process. If a particular country wants to make voting easier for younger citizens, citizens with 
busy lives who would otherwise not be able to miss work or other obligations to vote, or citizens 
temporarily residing or vacationing in locations away from their voting district, then 
implementing an internet voting system could help achieve this goal. Here, we can turn to the 
case in New South Wales where the state made internet voting an option for groups of people 
with historically low voter turnout, such as people with disabilities or those residing out of state 
during a particular election. When these groups could vote via the internet, overall turnout went 
up, suggesting that an internet voting system can increase voter turnout of those people that are 
least likely to vote.  
Furthermore, countries may implement an internet voting system not simply to increase 
voter turnout; rather voters might come to expect this mechanism since technology is so much a 
part of our lives. And that in turn might boost civic participation. While the argument could be 
made that certain demographic groups would be limited to vote by the implementation of online 
voting, such as the elderly or those who do not have an internet enabled device, offering internet 
voting as an additional option to civic participation would not deter voters who prefer traditional 
voting methods rather than implementing an internet voting system as the only option to vote. 
Additionally, the fact that the number of Americans that own an internet enabled device is 
already presumably high and growing, suggests that a majority of adults will be comfortable 
using this technology. 
It is possible that implementing an internet voting system does not significantly boost 
turnout, rather voters are merely switching their voting methods from traditional means to 
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internet voting. This situation was highlighted in the Estonia case, where each year significantly 
more people voted via the internet, but overall turnout only increased by a few percentage points 
subsequently. The argument could be made that although implementing internet voting does not 
significantly gain voters who would have otherwise not voted, the mechanism makes voting 
easier and therefore is preferred by voters who do vote in elections. 
A multiple of variables can affect voter turnout, from the weather on election day to the 
political climate around an election. I am unable to hold all factors constant, meaning that any 
deviation in an election's circumstance could affect voter turnout, instead of just the factor of 
internet voting. However, having found voter turnout to increase in three different countries 
across several election types, the variety of circumstances suggests a consistent effect that voter 
turnout does increase when internet voting is made an option.  
There are several potential limitations in my analysis, such as not being able to hold 
account for other factors that could have made voting easier in a given election. For example, 
Ontario’s municipalities vary in terms of the voting methods available, with some municipalities 
offering mail in ballots, phone ballots, braille ballots, magnified text, and rides to and from a 
polling station, or any mix of these options. This could affect the estimated impact of internet 
voting on turnout in a variety of ways. First, in elections where there are a multitude of options 
for voting, a higher voter turnout could be attributed to another voting method instead of just 
internet voting. Second, in areas where internet voting was not made an option, but other options 
were, voter turnout could be higher due to these alternative modes of voting compared to areas 
where only paper only ballots were an option. One study that tested the effects of internet voting 
in all 98 municipalities that have adopted it since 2014 controlled for some of the factors such as 
eliminating paper ballots, whether vote by mail was an option, and whether there were additional 
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registration costs associated with internet voting.67 They found internet voting still increases 
turnout where municipalities offer other convenience voting options, though the increase is 
significantly smaller than municipalities that do not offer other types of convenience voting.68 
This evidence suggests that in any given municipality, the implementation of internet voting is 
affected by multiple factors. Furthermore, there is a possibility that some regions that have 
implemented internet voting are systematically different from other regions that did not, which 
could affect overall turnout and therefore the estimated impact of internet voting on turnout.  
Further Discussion: Security Analysis and Blockchain 
  Some might conclude that seemingly marginal increases in voter turnout are not worth 
the costs of implementing a new voting system. Aside from the monetary costs of implementing 
a system, there is an even greater cost that the security of elections might be compromised.  It is 
vitally important to consider the security implications of internet voting. There is a risk that 
domestic political groups, foreign state actors, or cyberterrorists could hack the election to steal 
or change votes, altering the results of an election. Attacks may be especially attractive to 
cyberterrorist groups because such attacks would be recognizable, promoting motivation as it 
would cause chaos in the electoral system.69 There are several major potential threats with 
implementing an internet voting system. First, there is a potential for a hacker to gain access to 
an individual's computer via their software which would allow hackers to alter many individuals' 
votes.70 Second, a hacker could hack into someone's computer or an entire network revealing 
 
67 Goodman and Stokes, 9-10.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Aviel Rubin, “Security Considerations for Remote Electronic Voting,” Communications of the ACM 45, no. 12 
(2002): 44.  
70 Michael R. Alvarez and Thad E. Hall, Point, “Security and Internet Voting.” In Click, and Vote: The Future of 
Internet Voting, 1st ed. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2004) 83. 
Mummery 31 
voters’ preferences. This would present a huge privacy risk for voters. Third, a virus could be 
downloaded on many computers so that large scale amounts of computers shut down prior to an 
election, restricting individuals’ ability to vote or raising their costs to do so.71 Fourth, is the 
threat of a denial-of-service attack, which would occur from an individual sending mass amounts 
of information to the government website that the internet voting platform is on so that it would 
be flooded and shut down.72 In this case, internet voters would lose their ability to cast a ballot. 
Next, is the threat of spoofing, which would occur if a hacker encouraged individuals to vote via 
a fake website, thinking that they were legitimately casting their ballot. Not only is this a security 
implication because people would think they have cast a ballot when they haven't, but also 
because these fake websites would allow hackers to gain individuals’ voter information so they 
could cast real ballots.73 Lastly, there is a threat that since voters are not at a precinct location, 
individuals could be coerced or bribed to vote a certain way. This is a larger threat for groups 
such as the elderly or handicapped who can more easily be coerced into voting a certain way or 
convinced that someone who is helping them vote with the new technology is voting according 
to their preferences when they really are not.  
While these security risks seem hypothetical, there is evidence that they have happened 
before. In 2010, Washington D.C. created a pilot internet voting system which invited anyone to 
not only cast ballots, but also to attempt to hack the system.74 Within two days of the launch of 
the system, individuals were able to gain control over the server allowing them to change and 
reveal past and future votes. 
 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid, 84.  
74 Scott Wolchok, Eric Wustrow, Dawn Isabel, and Alex Halderman, “Attacking the Washington, D.C. Internet 
Voting System,” The University of Michigan. http://www.ifca.ai/fc12/pre-proceedings/paper_79.pdf 
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In light of the security implications of internet voting, one way to make an internet voting 
system more secure would be to implement a blockchain style internet voting mechanism. 
Blockchain is a technology first used in Bitcoin which is a peer-to-peer payment system for cash 
transactions via the internet without the need for a financial institution.75 This technology is 
essentially a public chain of linked data that carries information. Blockchain can be used in 
internet voting by creating a chain of blocks that contain a foundation block, which will be each 
candidate's name linked together with blocks of each voter who has voted for the candidate. Each 
block in the chain will be composed of a hash which is a voter’s identification or social security 
number which will be linked with the hash of the previous block, as well as the individuals’ 
vote.76 Each hash will be made using an advanced algorithm. For purpose of presentation, see 
figure 8 below: the foundation of the block is each candidate who is running for office, each 
block that makes up the chain contains a voter’s information and their vote which is titled 
“hash”, which is connected to all the previous voter’s information titled “previous hash”, 
ultimately making a chain that cannot be broken. This system is more secure because if anyone 
hacks the system and makes changes to votes along the way, the hash will change. This change 
can easily be identified because all the proceeding hashes will not line up and it would be 
impossible for a hacker to change all the hashes in all the blocks in the time between when 
people vote and when voting closes.  
 
 
 
75 Ahmed B. Ayed, “A Conceptual Secure Blockchain- Based Electronic Voting System,” International Journal of 
Network Security & its Applications 9, no. 3 (2017): 3. DOI: 10.5121/ijnsa.2017.9301 
76 Ibid.  
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Figure 8: 
 
 
Adapted image from: Ahmed B. Ayed, “A Conceptual Secure Blockchain- Based Electronic Voting System,” International Journal of Network 
Security & its Applications 9, no. 3 (2017): 3. DOI: 10.5121/ijnsa.2017.9301 
 
My research has found that in almost all cases tested, internet voting has increased voter 
turnout. In deciding whether or not to implement an internet voting system, states need to 
understand the tradeoffs between increases in voter turnout and the security implications with 
such a mechanism. As we continue further into the technological revolution and more daily and 
civic life moves online, states may be forced to adapt to internet voting. In this case, it is 
important for states to research and implement voting mechanisms such as blockchain which will 
reduce the security threat of internet voting.  In the future, we will have to ask ourselves whether 
internet voting enhances democratic participation or erodes it due to potential threats to the 
system.  
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